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Biology is Biography
Chris Crowe responds that definitions of medi­
cal 'risk'form a poor basis for a parenting vision.
Upon the birth of my daughter four 
years ago I had the occasion to ex­
perience first hand the degree of cul­
tural sig n ifican ce g iven , in our 
western society at least, to 'biology': in 
this case, the biological connectedness 
of parents to their offspring. I don't 
think my experience was uncommon; 
my daughter was 'claimed' as part of 
my family via biological connected­
ness. My daughter's arrival heralded 
new ways for my (biologically con­
nected) family to affirm what are es­
sentially social relationships. New 
categories of relationships were estab­
lished—aunt, uncle, grandmother 
and grandfather—with biology as the 
social binding. At one day old my 
daughter was minutely examined: she 
had my mother's hands, her father's 
feet, her great-grandfather's head 
shape, her uncle's nose and so on.
What was interesting was that at that 
stage my daughter's father and his 
family had severed social relations 
with each other. The 'biological 
similarity', or, as I would prefer to say, 
the urge to connect my daughter with 
her paternal family via biological 
symbolism was not evident, even to 
those with well-meaning intentions. 
Conflict on that side has since been 
resolved, and my daughter has been 
duly incorporated into her father's 
fam ily  by the sam e process of 
'recognition' of biological similarities. 
This experience has brought home to 
me the pow er of the biological 
metaphor. The force of the metaphor 
rests not on biology in itself, but on its 
use (in many societies) to affirm and 
strengthen social relations.
I have been researching the develop­
ment of In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) in 
order to outline a feminist critique of 
science and technology focusing on 
the power relations involved. Of 
course, examining IVF involves dis­
cussing a wide range of areas such as 
the concept of fertility, pregnancy and 
birth, and the meaning of parenting,
science, technology, and medicine. 
One of the most pervasive, although 
by no means victorious, influences on 
the cultural construction of reproduc­
tion (i.e. on how we think about preg­
nancy and childbearing) is the 
medical model.
Conception, pregnancy and birth are 
socially mediated biological events. 
Biological events do not have to be 
medical events, but with the rise of the 
'male midwife', the precursor of the 
obstetrician during tne 19th century, 
reproduction was brought within the 
confines of the bio-medical model.
Reproductive technologies refer to a 
range of medical interventions in the 
processes of pregnancy and 
childbirth, and with the advent of IVF 
the process of conception has also be­
come a medical issue. In other words, 
every aspect of women's reproduction 
has been brought under the auspices 
of the bio-medical model.
The bio-m edical model contains 
several assumptions about the body: 
the individual body can be separated 
from the social body (i.e. the social 
context), the body performs like a 
machine with organs carrying out cer­
tain functions, and that the mind is 
separable from the body. In other 
words, the body is strictly of the flesh, 
a 'biological given', part of 'nature'. 
Diseases are conceptualised as neutral 
entities which reside in nature—that 
is, in the body.
During the development of medicine 
as a profession the medicalisation of 
reproduction was one of the last areas 
of human activity to be brought under 
the auspices of the bio-medical model. 
It is not surprising that reproduction 
was one of the last areas to be incor­
porated, since the bio-medical model 
is attuned to curing infections and dis­
ease Yet reproduction is not a disease 
or even an abnormal condition. In 
order for reproduction to be included
as a medical condition, then, it has to 
be pathologised to some extent. Preg­
nancy then is perceived as a some­
what abnormal state for the body, with 
accom panying m edically defined 
'risks'. A pregnant woman's age is 
used as a medical factor in assessing 
the degree of 'risk' involved. Given 
this tendency, it is likely that a woman 
perceived 'at risk' will then have her 
pregnancy and childbearing made 
problematic
The medical definition of 'risk' is a 
constantly shifting one. The age for a 
woman to be considered 'at risk' 
varies from country to country, but the 
general trend is that the age con­
sidered safe for reproduction is get­
ting lower and lower. It is significant, 
however, that the degree to which a 
woman may be perceived to be 'at 
risk' is mediated by social factors, 
such as her location. Women in urban 
Australia, for example, are much more 
likely to undergo some form of 
rou tine in terven tion  such as 
ultrasound during pregnancy be­
cause the technology is available.
Economic circumstances, and posses­
sion of private health insurance, may 
also play a part in determining the 
degree of 'risk' involved. If we ex­
amine the extent of 'necessary inter­
vention during birth, for example, we 
find that the chance of a woman un­
dergoing caesarian section delivery is 
far greater if she is covered by private 
health insurance. My point here is that 
what is perceived as a medical condi­
tion, as a risk, may be mediated and 
influenced by social circumstances.
Reproductive technologies such as 
Chorion Villus Sampling (CVS) and 
amniocentesis have been introduced 
as prenatal tests which claim to detect 
certain foetal conditions deemed by 
some as undesirable. These tests may 
be offered to pregnant women over 40, 
37, 35 or 32 depending on the par­
ticular definition of risk in relation to 
age. The tendency to utilise these tests 
as a routine procedure is a manifesta­
tion of the general pathologisation of 
pregnancy. A technique initially intro­
duced for a very small group of 
women considered 'at risk' during
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pregnancy becomes a routine proce­
dure for many. With the proliferation 
of reproductive technologies involved 
with su rveillan ce of a pregnant 
woman's body, the chances are that 
more 'risks' will arise.
course, these issues have always been 
present; the expansion of reproduc­
tive technologies have highlighted 
these debates and brought what was 
previously considered by many to be 
'private' into the 'public'.
At the moment, age is a dominant fac­
tor in determining 'risk'. 1 would 
argue that that this is part of an at­
tempt to contain reproduction within 
the bio-medical model. The tensions 
involved in attempting to incorporate 
reproduction into the bio-medical 
model, in line with the 'disease 
model', are great By introducing age 
as a medical factor, the tensions are 
somewhat alleviated. In other words, 
the expanding medical definitions of 
'risk' currently based on age, allow 
more pregnancies to be pathologised, 
or at least problematised.
It is from this perspective that I ap­
proach some of the issues raised in 
Romaine's article above. I agree that 
one's fertility should not be seen as a 
never-ending resource and should be 
seen as a potential. Fertility is actually 
a relationship or interaction rather 
than a static entity, since fertility can 
never be "assessed" on one's own. 
Reproduction, a fulfilment of fertility 
potential, is a biological event which 
is quintessentially social. I agree that 
parenting should be given more im­
portance, and social infrastructure 
should be put into place which meets 
the needs of parents and potential 
parents so that more acceptable op­
tions are created, thus enriching the 
lives of children and all adults.
In addressing some of the main 
themes raised by Romaine, I wish to 
add to the debate around reproduc­
tion, parenting and non-parenting. Of
My first sense of unease came when 
reading that, of a sample of eighteen 
pregnant women, the only ones who 
had 'uncomplicated' pregnancies and 
births were those who were under 
thirty. W ithout knowing further 
details, one might hypothesise follow­
ing my previously made point about 
'risk' in the bio-medical model, that 
perhaps pregnant women of a certain 
age are more likely to have their preg­
nancies and/or births complicated 
rather than having complicated preg­
nancies and/or births.
On a more general theme, the ad­
vocacy of a social policy which en­
courages childbearing between the 
ages of 25 and 30, because this is 
deemed to be the 'healthiest' time, 
comes close to accepting the bio-medi­
cal model of reproduction—a model 
which separates the biological body 
from the social context, and which as­
serts (in this case) that reproductive 
organs and fertility in general are at 
optimum performance levels and 
should be utilised at that time. The 
implication here is that reproduction 
is seen primarily as a biological func­
tion, and this function should be per­
formed at peak times which are 
defined and redefined by the bio­
medical model.
Reproduction is a life event which 
may or may not take place according 
to one's life situation. In brief, even if 
one has children before the age of thir­
ty, the desire to have another or more
children may arise at a later stage be­
cause of changed social and/or finan­
cial circumstances, or even simply the 
desire to do so. Biological fitness may 
be one factor to take into account at 
such a stage, but in privileging biol­
ogy over other factors there may be a 
tendency to view reproduction as a 
strictly biological rather than a more 
broadly social event.
There is also the question of the 
ecological sustainability of the choices 
we m ake about rep roduction. 
Romaine seems to imply that ecologi­
cal sustainability may involve making 
choices either to have fewer children 
or no children at all. This seems to rest 
on the 'overpopulation' thesis that 
high population contributes to im­
poverished circumstances both in­
dividually and nationally. This is a 
contentious argument which does not 
hold up under scrutiny. My response 
would be that the concept of ecologi­
cal sustainability needs to be clarified 
to avoid adopting unwanted and 
'hazardous' conceptual frameworks 
in our debates.
In general I don't see any necessary 
op p osition  betw een fem inist 
demands for increasing choices, and 
the recognition by feminists that there 
need to be different attitudes which 
respect both diversity and a balance in 
the ecosystem. There need not be any 
opposition if the choices created come 
from women themselves. At present, 
'choice' is confined to a series of 
yes/no decisions in relation to a num­
ber of options presented to women. 
Some of us may be able to 'choose' 
from  a v irtual su p erm arket of 
reproductive options, but do not par­
ticipate in the creation of the choices 
themselves.
Our bodies tell a story about who we 
are and who we have been, and what 
has happened to us in our lives. One's 
life history is essentially a social his­
tory. In this light I would regard 
'biology' not as a static entity passed 
on to us via genetic inheritance, but as 
a physical symbol of our social life— 
our biology is at the same time our 
biography.
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